

AD-A158 430

EAST ASIA TRENDS PHASE II REPORT TOPIC A-9 PROSPECTS
FOR CONTINUITY AND C. (U) DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON DC OFFICE OF EXTERNAL RESEARCH..
D E WEATHERBEE ET AL. 1985 FAR-155A-84 F/G 5/4

1/1

UNCLASSIFIED


F/G 5/4

NL

END

FILMSTOCK ©

DTM



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

FAR 155A-24

(2)


EAST ASIA TRENDS

Phase Two Report

Topic A-9

Prospects for Continuity and Change
in Japan's Domestic, Economic, and
Political Policies: 1985 - 1990

AD-A158 430



This paper was prepared for the Department of State as part
of its external research program. Views or conclusions con-
tained herein should not be construed as representing the
official position or policy of the Department of State.

DTIC
SELECTE
AUG 10 1985

DTIC FILE COPY

INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
University of South Carolina

This report is available
for public distribution.

PROSPECTS FOR CONTINUITY
AND CHANGE IN JAPAN'S DOMESTIC ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL POLICIES
1985-1990

Institute of International Studies
University of South Carolina

Contract No. 1722-420155

Dr. Donald E. Weatherbee, Principal Investigator
Dr. James M. Roherty, Co-Investigator
Dr. James M. Myers, Co-Investigator
Mr. Kiyohiko Ito, Research Assistant
Mr. Taifa Yu, Research Assistant
Mr. Motoshi Suzuki, Research Assistant

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. In a study which undertakes to judge the prospects for continuity and change in the Japanese economy and polity over the near-term (1985-1990) the critical problem at the outset is that of selecting an approach (a methodology). In the present study we attempt to identify and assess key variables in Japanese 'political culture' which explain continuity and change, i.e., those variables which are most specifically Japanese.
2. The family and workplace are vital units of value foundation and reinforcement with the latter assuming an increasing role in light of Japan's postwar economic achievements. While there are some indications of value change and structural change in the family these are moderated through the stabilizing environment of the workplace.
3. Japan has taken two key steps to insure continuing economic viability: (1) it will work on the leading edge of science and technology to guarantee wholly new product lines and position itself in the arms sector, and (2) it will step up efforts of 'economic internationalization' with more attention to non-trade aspects. Economic viability remains more than ever a sine qua non of Japanese political stability.
4. The possibilities for a stable, representative political system (and thus policy outputs which will meet basic public needs) lie deep in the 'culture' of Japan on the one hand and in the exigencies of the international system with which Japan must cope. Any assessment of this issue will encounter paradoxes: Japan remains instinctively insecure, vulnerable, and isolationist; on the other hand Japan skillfully engages itself in the international environment to cope with what are at bottom psychic needs.
5. The principal political instrumentality through which Japan has governed itself in the postwar period, the Liberal Democratic Party, is a repository of this paradox. In the near-term years it will go through a major debate and factional realignment. The scope and extent of the 'internationalization' thrust will be defined against a background of 'internalization' pressures. The requirements of newly emerging factional leaders to gain commanding positions will result in a strong orientation to a 'domestic agenda' and the emergence of 'local' political figures.
6. As the issue of 'internationalization' is carried beyond that of 'economic internationalization' (i.e., those steps required to maintain a viable economy) to a consideration of an active political-military role in the world considerable restraint is likely to be exhibited by the political leadership finely attuned to the political culture as they are. Fundamental values in Japanese culture which reinforce continuity and stability have been dominant for four decades - in the face of major forces of change - and are not likely to be dislodged except by extraordinary external demands on the system. The latter contingency can never be excluded.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introductory Statement

I. CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE ECONOMY

- . The Economy as a Function of Culture
- . Advancing to the Frontiers of the Post-Industrial Era
- . The Economy as a Function of the International Environment

II. CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE POLITY

- . The Polity as a Function of Culture
- . The Polity and the LDP
- . The Polity as a Function of the Partnership with the US

END NOTES

Introductory Statement. In this paper our purpose is to illuminate some of the underlying dynamics of the Japanese economy and the Japanese polity. Readers of the paper will be fully acquainted with the current state of political and economic affairs in Japan. Consequently, we shall confine ourselves to identification and analysis of explanatory variables, a consciousness of which is essential to understanding Japanese policies. To begin with, we believe it will be useful to distinguish 'the economy' and 'the polity'. While one must be fully cognizant of the inter-relationship of the two there has been, perhaps, too much analysis of contemporary Japan which fuses the two realms. Each, we believe, will be better illuminated by separate treatment along with some concluding observations about the catalytic action of the one upon the other.

Japan's 'economic miracle' (of the 1960's -1970's), or what some would choose to call 'the second modernization' has clearly overshadowed that country's political development since 1945. As a result, quite understandably, more attention has been directed to 'the economy' than to 'the polity.' The functioning and 'outputs' of the Japanese polity, it is probably fair to say, are not well understood. Yet, arguably, the same underlying variables are at the root of both economic and political behavior. In our effort to discern patterns of change and patterns of continuity in the Japanese economy and polity we shall focus on an endogenous variable - culture - and an exogenous variable - the international environment - to assist in understanding these patterns. Within this framework we shall underline a significant 'trend' in the economic realm (the Japanese decision to work at the leading edge of

science and technology) and in the political realm (growing indications of 'internalization' within the major political party, i.e., the Liberal Democratic Party).

It is, no doubt, necessary to stress that in taking the approach outlined above (in what is, explicitly, an interpretive study of 'prospects for continuity and change') there is no implication that we have discovered the 'Rosetta Stone' for understanding Japanese behavior. What we do affirm is that an attempt to trace emerging Japanese economic and political developments to roots in 'the culture' and 'the environment' is at once a useful and necessary approach - to be laid alongside others (See End Notes, Number Two). The writer wishes to acknowledge the contributions to this study of Kiyohiko Ito and Motoshi Suzuki, graduate research assistants in the Institute of International Studies, University of South Carolina.

Acquisition For	
1. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CHAI	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
2. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
4. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
5. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
6. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
7. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
8. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
9. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
10. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
11. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
12. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
13. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
14. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
15. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
16. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
17. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
18. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
19. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
20. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
21. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
22. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
23. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
24. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
25. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
26. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
27. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
28. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
29. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
30. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
31. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
32. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
33. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
34. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
35. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
36. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
37. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
38. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
39. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
40. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
41. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
42. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
43. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
44. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
45. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
46. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
47. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
48. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
49. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
50. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
51. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
52. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
53. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
54. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
55. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
56. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
57. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
58. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
59. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
60. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
61. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
62. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
63. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
64. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
65. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
66. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
67. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
68. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
69. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
70. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
71. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
72. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
73. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
74. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
75. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
76. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
77. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
78. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
79. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
80. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
81. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
82. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
83. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
84. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
85. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
86. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
87. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
88. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
89. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
90. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
91. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
92. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
93. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
94. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
95. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
96. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
97. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
98. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
99. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
100. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
101. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
102. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
103. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
104. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
105. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
106. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
107. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
108. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
109. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
110. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
111. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
112. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
113. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
114. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
115. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
116. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
117. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
118. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
119. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
120. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
121. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
122. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
123. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
124. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
125. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
126. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
127. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
128. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
129. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
130. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
131. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
132. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
133. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
134. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
135. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
136. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
137. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
138. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
139. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
140. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
141. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
142. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
143. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
144. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
145. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
146. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
147. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
148. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
149. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
150. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
151. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
152. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
153. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
154. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
155. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
156. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
157. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
158. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
159. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
160. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
161. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
162. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
163. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
164. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
165. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
166. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
167. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
168. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
169. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
170. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
171. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
172. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
173. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
174. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
175. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
176. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
177. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
178. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
179. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
180. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
181. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
182. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
183. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
184. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
185. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
186. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
187. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
188. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
189. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
190. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
191. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
192. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
193. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
194. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
195. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
196. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
197. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
198. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
199. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
200. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
201. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
202. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
203. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
204. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
205. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
206. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
207. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
208. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
209. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
210. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
211. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
212. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
213. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
214. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
215. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
216. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
217. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
218. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
219. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
220. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
221. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
222. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
223. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
224. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
225. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
226. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
227. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
228. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
229. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
230. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
231. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
232. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
233. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
234. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
235. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
236. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
237. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
238. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
239. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
240. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
241. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
242. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
243. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
244. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
245. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
246. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
247. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
248. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
249. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
250. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
251. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
252. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
253. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
254. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
255. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
256. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
257. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
258. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
259. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
260. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
261. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
262. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
263. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
264. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
265. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
266. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
267. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
268. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
269. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
270. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
271. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
272. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
273. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
274. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
275. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
276. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
277. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
278. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
279. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
280. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
281. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
282. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
283. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
284. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
285. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
286. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
287. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
288. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
289. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
290. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
291. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
292. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
293. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
294. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
295. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
296. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
297. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
298. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
299. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
300. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
301. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
302. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
303. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
304. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
305. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
306. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
307. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
308. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
309. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
310. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
311. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
312. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
313. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
314. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
315. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
316. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
317. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
318. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
319. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
320. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
321. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
322. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
323. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
324. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
325. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
326. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
327. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
328. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
329. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
330. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
331. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
332. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
333. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
334. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
335. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
336. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
337. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
338. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
339. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
340. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
341. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
342. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
343. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
344. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
345. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
346. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
347. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
348. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
349. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
350. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
351. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
352. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
353. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
354. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
355. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
356. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
357. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
358. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
359. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
360. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
361. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
362. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
363. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
364. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
365. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
366. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
367. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
368. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
369. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
370. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
371. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
372. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
373. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
374. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
375. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
376. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
377. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
378. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
379. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
380. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
381. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
382. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
383. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
384. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
385. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
386. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
387. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
388. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
389. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
390. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
391. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
392. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
393. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
394. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
395. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
396. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
397. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
398. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
399. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
400. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
401. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
402. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
403. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
404. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
405. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
406. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
407. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
408. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
409. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
410. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
411. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
412. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
413. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
414. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
415. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
416. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
417. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
418. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
419. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
420. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
421. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
422. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
423. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
424. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
425. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
426. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
427. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
428. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
429. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
430. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
431. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
432. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
433. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
434. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
435. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
436. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
437. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
438. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
439. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
440. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
441. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
442. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
443. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
444. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
445. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
446. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
447. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
448. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
449. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
450. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
451. <input type="checkbox"/> Other	

I. CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE ECONOMY

The Economy as a Function of Culture. The work-place in Japan has been called the second forum ('the second round') - after the family - in which the component values of the culture are reinforced. Indeed, some current observers contend that insofar as there may be erosion of traditional values in the first round (within the forum of the family) this is compensated for by the structure and discipline of the work-place. The net result has been that throughout the post-World War II period there has been a stability in the Japanese family and work-place quite remarkable in the face of the change that has marked the period. Significant weakening in either 'round' of value reinforcement would not only have grave consequences for the economy but even more far reaching consequences for the polity and the world. In this section we shall offer an interpretation of recent research findings on how a society noted for its cultural strength has been impacted by broad and swift currents of change. Japan could well prove noteworthy for its degree of imperviousness to forces of change and for the degree to which the economy is central to nationhood and (with the family) central to culture.

Japan as an island nation with high ethnic homogeneity has maintained its distinctive national character. Foremost among the elements shaping this character (establishing the culture) is Confucianism (part of 'the cultural legacy' from China). The 'verities' of Confucianism, e.g., hierarchy, reciprocity, interdependence, place emphasis on units, structures, institutions - not on the individual person. The first of these 'units' in Japan is the family. Its primacy

is not diminished by the prominence of other institutions or by other 'historical forces' contributing to the total culture. What is taking place in this 'first forum' (family dynamics) can ultimately have farther reaching ramifications than the dynamics of other forums precisely because the family remains today the critical cultural unit in Japan. Any evidence of change here is worthy of close investigation.

Two major changes in the family structure since World War II - in no small part a result of spectacular economic growth - must be noted. First, the average family size has been reduced (5.0 persons in 1950 to 3.25 in 1983) and, secondly, married women now constitute the majority of the female work force. These changes have brought about decreasing contact between the mother and children - always a fundamental dimension of Japanese family life. This fact may have significance over time because 'dependency' is largely shaped in one's childhood.¹ Japanese perceptions of personal relations within the family may very well be changing faster than the de facto situation warrants. For example, a recent survey shows that Japanese children respect their parents less than before. (Kenji Suzuki, ed. Za-Abereiiji (The Average), Tokyo, 1984). Yet while a perception or attitudinal change is noted here children still depend materially on their parents. Approximately 75% of Japanese college students depend for their living expenses (and tuition) on their parents. In short, while Japanese youth may not have the 'traditional' view of the family, there is very little evidence to suggest any fundamental change in the 'dependency' relationships of the family.

Most Japanese youth immediately upon graduation take employment with companies which are, themselves, for of traditional values. In this 'second forum' there will be value reinforcement which not guaranteeing company loyalty or life-long employment does have a noteworthy success rate. A wage system has been designed to hold Japanese workers in one company. Promotion and retirement bonuses are very much part of the incentive system and can be affected by changing jobs. Still, such incentives do not prevent younger workers particularly, from doing just that. Suzuki's data shows that 87.3% of male workers have changed their work-place at least once by the age of twenty-five and that the average length of stay in one company among male workers is 11.5 years. (He does not attempt to control for size of firm.) Low wages is cited by workers in their twenties as a major reason for changing work-place if not occupation. It is interesting to note, however, that more often than not changing one's work-place does not result in higher wages. No evidence has been adduced to suggest that stability in the work force is a looming issue.

The issue of 'company loyalty' must be distinguished from the broader question of maintaining traditional values in the work-place. The latter remains very much intact even in the face of some question about the former. (For one thing, it has been pointed out that 'company loyalty' may have a bushido element in it!) Japanese corporations, by and large, maintain and underline a seniority-based promotion system, 'groupism', and loyalty to the group (company). Senior employees become repositories of traditional values having followed their seniors before

them. Junior employees are to adhere rigorously to the instruction of Seniors during their training period. Harmony (wa) within this hierarchical structure is of the essence. Initial reinforcement occurs for those adhering to the system by feeling the comfort of belonging to the group. If one deviates or breaks away there is 'alienation' - a breaking of wa. The impact can be extreme. The objective is 'dependency' precisely because it is through dependency that psychic health and productivity is enhanced. The two are one. Evidence concerning the transferability of the Japanese 'work ethic' is so mixed as to suggest it is not likely to be effective outside its cultural bounds.

This second round of value reinforcement appears to largely make up for any erosion of traditional family ties and values (in the first round). Japanese discomfiture with radical change (no revolution of any kind has ever taken place) has operated to keep an ongoing process of change within allowable margins. Radical change would occur only with 'systemic failure' in both rounds. In sum, the Japanese socio-cultural system remains a powerful stabilizing factor. At the same time what has happened to the Japanese economy in only forty years could well be described as 'revolutionary.'

Four decades of economic evolution can be summarized as follows: (1) From Occupation to the Korean War, (2) A Follow-on Decade (1953-1964) of Accelerating Recovery, (3) A Decade of Sustained Rapid Growth (1965-1974), and (4) A Decade of Adjustment and Slowing of the Pace (1975-1985). Without reviewing this evolution in any detail, it is

important to note how critical external factors (the international environment) have been in this evolutionary process.

In the first period a devastated economy, rife with black market operations, high inflation, and unemployment was in the hands of an Allied Occupation Force bent on reform. Reform had to give way in large part to rehabilitation efforts. Substantial American economic assistance poured into the country. However, it was the Korean War that more than any other factor provided the boost that took Japan out of the economic doldrums.

After 'independence' in 1952, the Japanese Government modified several Occupation measures. Anti-Monopoly and tax laws were amended in favor of large corporations. The Zaibatsu, initially prohibited, was reorganized into a new chain of business, industrial and trading companies (Sogo-Shosha). This was a period in which the Japanese Government began to develop its formal planning, assistance and guidance role so prominent today. It seized on reparations payments as a device for opening diplomatic channels and initiating economic penetration of recipient countries, especially in Southeast Asia. Ranking number five in the world in GNP terms, Japan by the end of the second postwar decade had moved into the international economy.

In the next two decades (the heart of the 'economic miracle') Japan became second only to the US among advanced industrial economies. Now she was forced by pressures from abroad to take steps towards trade and investment liberalization. Considerable restrictions were removed by 1974 though pressures would continue. Japanese investment overseas

gained momentum throughout the 1960's and early 1970's focused on enhancement of trade opportunities. This was a period of rapid internationalization of the Japanese economy. The final period (1975-1985) has been one of transition from rapid expansion to slower growth with investment directed to public overhead programs. It remains an export-led economy with greater emphasis on active contributions to developing countries. Both domestic and international imperatives have dictated the present pattern.

Japanese economic progress since 1945 has taken it from a semi-agricultural base through industrialization to a still ill-defined post-industrial era. Per capita GNP grew from \$20 in 1945 to \$8900 forty years later. Workers engaged in primary industry decreased from 37.6% in 1955 to 9.3% three decades later. Employment in tertiary industry has grown from 38.1% in 1955 to 56.3% in 1983. Dramatic economic success has not been achieved without concomitant wrenching of social structures. Lagging behind industrial and capital growth are such sectors as housing, sanitation, social welfare programs, and environmental controls. Continuing high levels of production and consumption have taxed Japan's limited natural resources, energy and environmental capacity. Population shifts from rural areas to urban centers have presented labor distribution problems not recognized at the outset. Negative outcomes have been part of the Economic Miracle and pose constraints on pursuing the initial thrusts of economic activity. Redirection of this activity and the establishment of quality of life priorities will increasingly mark the fifth decade.

Among the seniors one is normally recognized as the leader and beneath him are distributed various ranks of juniors. Although seniority and age result in a considerable authority, the responsibility of considering each member's position and ideas and the need to maintain group consensus often results in a participative (albeit sometimes contentious) discussion. Once a decision is made it commands the loyalty of the members. The group structures of Japan cannot be considered 'authoritarian'. Authority resides in the group and derives from adherence to group process. The decisions of the group are authoritative. Not enough stress has been put upon the dependency relationship between group leader and junior members for example. The leader may well be constrained to accept "rule of the higher by the lower", for not to accept recommendations from juniors would cause loss of face on their part and such the leader cannot countenance.

The possibilities for a system of governance in Japan that is stable, authoritative and responsive to the most basic psychological needs of the Japanese people will depend on the degree to which government structures (groups) embody and adhere to the cultural traits outlined above. It will not be crucial whether this governing process aligns with the norms of Western democracy, much less whether it can be styled democracy; it will be sufficient if that system stems authentically from the people, avoids tyranny and anarchy. In 1945 Japan was ready to move forward - again - to institutionalize dominant cultural norms in its governing system. There is every basis for the conclusion that this process has been successful. While the polity in

maintaining political-social stability in Japan in the face of great and varied pressures for change. To those who will respond that this is 'the 1930s aberration' theory with a vengeance a rejoinder is required. In the century, more or less, since the end of the Shogunate, restoration of the Emperor, and the issuance of the Meiji constitution Japan has had one period (1930-45) which can fairly be described as militaristic - and brief. This is by no means tantamount to saying that the preceding half century was 'democratic.' It is possible to say of this half century, however, that propensities for constitutional democracy were not only evident but oftentimes strong. They were aborted in the movement surrounding the assassination of Premier Hamaguchi (November 14, 1930). It is plausible to contend that these propensities were given new life in the post-war, American-drafted constitution. The writer knows of no student of Japanese affairs so rash as to contend that the 'constitutional democratic propensities of modern Japan' are now irrevocably in place. It is sufficient to point to the striking fact that they have been in place for four decades and that nothing looms on the near-term horizon to suggest their displacement.

We have already put "the primacy and salience of the household" as the fundamental characteristic of Japanese culture. Embodied in this foundation premise are the associated characteristics of 'collectivity' and 'hierarchy' which it goes without saying stand in contrast to traits of individuality. The Japanese disposition is to function in a group (rather than in individual contexts) at all levels. Just as a household has a leader and a hierarchical structure so, too, do other groups.

Pye contends that "the concept of political culture suggests that the traditions of society, the spirit of its public institutions, the passions and collective reasoning of its citizenry, and the style and operating codes of its leaders are not just random products of its historical experience but fit together as part of a meaningful whole and constitute an intelligible web of relations...it gives a systematic structure of values and rational considerations which ensures coherence in the performance of institutions and organizations." Again, one need not go as far as Pye in implying that culture produces structures (that there is a causal direction to the relation between culture and structure), indeed, one must be cognizant of the tendency of 'political culture' studies to underscore stability and discount dynamics. Still, it matters (greatly) which society (or polity) one is looking at: there is considerable consensus that in the case of Japan the use of 'political culture' for purposes of analysis is likely to be highly productive.²

The Meiji Constitution does not stand as a monument to the historical progress of liberal democracy. It made only minimal concessions to representative government while its authors sought to maintain their positions of authority. Yet it is undoubtedly correct in this case, as in so many other similar cases, that it set in motion forces which the authors did not envisage and which forces although suffering reverses, have come to prevail in present-day Japan. From the standpoint of 'political culture' this represents the ascendancy of elements deeply ingrained in the collective psyche which give promise of

II. CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE POLITY

The Polity as a Function of Culture. In an extended interview some years ago the present prime minister of Japan told the writer that Japan 'stood in cultural awe' of China that, indeed, Japan was 'the cultural legatee' of China. Mr. Nakasone was quite aware that he was touching on a subject upon which there was great controversy among scholars. The significance of the statement, however, is that we have here the firmly held view of the current political leader of Japan. In his statement we have as well an important insight into Japanese 'political culture'. That is to say in any attempt to understand the dynamics of Japanese politics we are well advised to turn to a culture taken in so many important respects from China, but which at the same time has a 'uniqueness' that must not be missed.

"Every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political actions" (G. Almond). Almond found this notion of 'political culture' more useful than terminology such as 'national character' and 'cultural ethos'. Robert Ward's studies of Japanese politics proceed from this starting point: "a country's political system is a product of its total culture...its politics (Japan's) does not develop separately from the geographic, social, economic, ideological, scientific or historical elements of the culture but interacts with all of them....". (Ward's unabashed optimism about the building of 'liberal democracy' on this cultural foundation is not as widely shared as is the notion of using 'political culture' as a starting point for analysis!). Carrying this point farther yet Lucian

exchange rate was 11.3 percent), the Japanese grant element (soft loans), and technical cooperation, grants, and disbursement to multilateral agencies are the lowest except for Austria among the 17 Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members. The second ODA doubling plan started in 1981 will not be completed until March 1986 because of budgetary constraints and then it will be about 2 per cent short of the intended disbursement (2,488.8 billion yen). Japan's bilateral ODA has largely gone to Asian countries (the top ten countries are all Asian countries accounting for 2/3 of the total) followed by Latin American countries (9.9%), and countries in the Middle east (8.4%). Japan as the second economic power in free-market oriented countries has yet to demonstrate a full assistance commitment to developing countries. Her trade, direct foreign investment, and ODA practices remaining subjects for continuing intensive negotiations.

international economic system. The larger question may well be what can others do in conjunction with Japan to rationalize import/export patterns. Some part of the answer may be found in changing investment patterns. Japanese firms (the decisions appear to be decisions of the individual firms for the most part) are developing a parallel pattern of investment along with overseas trade. Whatever the corporate motivations may be their investments in the US have contributed to industrial cooperation between the two countries. A 1983 Conference Board opinion survey indicated that Japanese corporate investment in the US has contributed to (1) an increase in employment, (2) an increase in capital inflow, (3) an increase in US tax revenues, and (4) an increase in technology transfer to the US from Japan. Some have suggested that similar benefits are provided by imported goods themselves. In any case, Japan is embarked on a program of direct investment in highly industrialized countries subject to cooperation by those countries. Direct foreign investment in Japan has also shown a marked increase in recent years with American industries leading the way. High-tech industries such as Texas Instruments, Motorola and IBM have expanded their operations in Japan as part of a broader trend that grows yearly. Overall the annual investment level in Japan by foreign firms has risen approximately 1,000% between 1975 and 1985.

Japan's Official Development Assistance is still far behind that of other advanced industrialized countries in quantity and quality. Although its ODA has been increasing rapidly since the mid-1970's (i.e., annual growth rate of ODA from 1977/78 to 1982/83 at 1982 price and

and official development assistance. Japan can be expected to make a conscious effort to avoid the approaches taken to such issues in the pre-World War II period.

Japan's trade balances with almost all industrialized countries are favorable and with almost all primary producing countries unfavorable. This structural reality is not new nor is it likely to change. Change, insofar as it will occur, must take place within this framework. Expectations that somehow the Prime Minister of Japan can appreciably alter trade, investment or assistance policies are not well placed. Such decisions are diffused through the firms, themselves, key bureaucracies, and ultimately the politicians. But an even more salient dimension of Japan's economic 'structure' is her self-sufficiency in manufactured goods. There is very little requirement to import such items. Japan has one of the lowest rates of importation of manufactures in the world and one of the highest rates of importation of primary goods (raw materials). What is new today is new only in degree: Japan's rate of exports of manufactured goods (particularly to the US and the EEC) is increasing (as is its importation of raw materials). This trend will undoubtedly continue for the balance of the decade unless restrictions are imposed by trading partners. Again, Japanese industrial leaders are under great pressure to enter new market sectors with 'leading edge' products.

The evidence is strong that whatever Japan can do about this situation she cannot do alone. Similarly, whatever Japan's trading partners might do on their own is most likely to be damaging to the

contributed so greatly to the Japanese 'economic miracle' to point out that international factors have played a crucial role as well. The absolutely vital function of a compatible international environment and, in particular, the 'special relationship' with the United States in the early post-war years are not adequately portrayed in many explanations of Japan's startling economic success. The 'economic miracle' has two foundation stones - one internal and one external and in a very real sense consists of the fortuitous conjunction of the two. The composition and magnitude of the export-import flow, Japan's high stimulation of exports, her concentration of export industries, her reluctance on such matters as yen revaluation and 'liberalization' all bear on whether Japan can better "...associate her interests with the smooth functioning of the global economic system." They are particular complications of the bilateral relationship with the United States.

Having established the international economic system known as Bretton Woods, the US more or less successfully guided that system into the 1970's. At the same time, however, Japan imposed high tariff barriers on imports and severely restricted foreign investment operations in its domestic markets while her own exports and investments overseas steadily increased. The end of the Bretton Woods system, followed by two world-wide petroleum crises, profoundly impacted the global economy not excluding Japan. Although there are some indications of recovery today, trade imbalances among advanced industrial countries and between North and South remain. The present world economic situation poses the stiffest test yet for Japan's ability to make adjustments in such areas as trade liberalization, foreign investment

especially abroad) led inexorably to Pearl Harbor, no matter how subject to charges that it is 'determinist', is not uncommon in post-World War II Japanese scholarship and, therefore, must be taken account of as part of the Japanese mindset. The depressed condition of the Japanese economy at the end of the 1920's, the added deflationary effect of the upward revaluation of the yen in 1930, and the still further contraction of international trade after the 'Manchurian Incident' (1931) are frequently cited as having led to war a decade later. What is significant about this line of argument is not whether it provides an objective account of the causes that led to war in the Pacific, but the salience of international factors (i.e., the environment) in the minds of Japanese assessing the stability of their economy. What is striking about the argument - no matter how tortuous it may be regarded - is the tight linkage between the stability of the Japanese economy and the stability of the Japanese psyche. Implicit in the argument is the arresting hypothesis that the trigger of Japanese nationalism is to be found in the Japanese economy and, in turn, in the international environment. Some would suggest that this hypothesis has even stronger supportive evidence today. The 'Economic Miracle Generation' is tied to a quality-of-life expectancy rather than a particular political ideology. This carries the implication that a people accustomed to the benefits of economic growth may prove volatile in the face of significant economic dislocation. International isolation means first and foremost for Japanese being cut off from import/export markets.

It detracts not at all from 'domestic factors' which have

leading edge of military technology. This prospect has given further impetus to reconsideration of the ban on arms export (and of Japan's military status generally, for that matter). It does not come simply from the government. The major thrust has come from within the ranks of the corporate sector, in particular from that element now identified as the boei-zoku - the defense tribe. All along, no doubt, the least stringent aspects of Japan's 'arms allergy' has been the ban on arms export. This particular example of self-abnegation had not posed any economic strain in periods of economic growth. Since the late seventies, however, this issue has been addressed. When signs of market-leveling were unmistakable the burgeoning defense sector of Japanese industry began to raise questions about the wisdom of self-denial. It was clear at this point that, for better or worse, international arms transfers constituted a major growth sector in the international economy. Japan as a leading international trader excluded from a dynamic sector of that trade by its own actions was thought by many in Japan to be something more than an interesting anomaly. If the Japanese commitment to high technology on the one hand and a growth of the defense sector of industry on the other requires 'economies of scale' that can only be realized through export of arms we can expect to see yet another historic adaptation in the near future. Whether such pressures from the corporate sector will result in policy changes cannot be stated with certainty. One can be more certain that these pressures will build.

The Economy as a Function of the International Environment

The theme that economic breakdown (major perturbations at home but

The new strategy will involve not only the 'top ten' industrial firms in Japan, but as one writer has put it "an army of lesser firms" as well. It is not at all likely that these firms will be executing anything like a comprehensive master plan. Decisions concerning exploratory R & D will be on a firm by firm basis for the most part. The extent of the involvement of the Japanese government in such matters tends to be exaggerated. That is not to say, however, that the role of public sector agencies is not a critical one. MITI's use of 'administrative guidance' and its adroit use of loan provisions in the law to support ('subsidize') targeted industries (or sectors of industries) sends vital signals to the private sector. In tandem MITI will commit one hundred million dollars to computer firms (and an additional four hundred million to the fifth generation project) and Japanese semiconductor firms on their own volition will raise their R & D expenditures eighty (80%) per cent in one year (1983-84). There are some real and immediate constraints: Japan does not have a significant science manpower base; in particular it lacks the systems engineers essential to the creation of large, full-scale systems such as aircraft. There is also evidence that Japan does not have within its, otherwise, highly effective bureaucracy a sufficient number of gikan (technically skilled officials) who would be receptive to the demands of an 'R & D race'. Whether this gikan problem will prove a constraint on smooth government-industry relations will be worth noting.

Underlying the new commitment to exploratory R & D are the military implications. In the final decade of the century Japan will move to the

inconsistent with 'the cultural surround' (E. E. Morrison), and (2) Japan is positioning itself to compete in market areas in which she has not, heretofore, been present - including the expanding international market for 'high tech' weapon systems.

Industrial leaders have become increasingly apprehensive over the past decade about a number of trends which, should they not be addressed in terms of new and innovative strategies, would slow Japan's economic momentum, and in short order would see her falling behind both Europe and the United States. There is, first of all, recognition of the fact that 'high technology' and more precisely basic, exploratory R & D is an extraordinarily dynamic variable in the global economy. It was this variable which was steadily reducing the generation span in product turnover. At the same time these industrial leaders saw the approach of 'market leveling-off'. The latter could be compensated for by more intensive marketing strategies only marginally. What was required to maintain market sectors and market shares was a new capacity to make generational leaps in product lines. It would not be enough to rely on 'product improvement' (applied R & D) in the face of the American and European emphasis on the now clearly perceived driving factor, namely, basic, exploratory R & D. Leveling-off in GNP growth rates (3-4%), in savings rates (18-20%), and over time the possibility of reduced labor supply were additional warning flags to Japanese industry that new departures must be devised. In order to maintain the vitality and competitiveness of Japan in the international economy an historic shift in resource allocation (to basic R & D) was decided upon.

nation, as it is about economics: while Japan has been supremely conscious of the role of critical resources in the power balance and while she has directed enormous efforts to obtaining access to those resources (e.g., fuel and non-fuel minerals), she now concludes that her long-term ("comprehensive") security is likely to be more affected by her capacity to place herself at the leading edge of science and technology. In some degree this hypothesis is a derivative of the even broader hypothesis that technological competition is, in many crucial respects, displacing conventional politico-military competition. Japan, in any event, finding the US and the European Community committed to 'the R & D race' has made the decision to get into the race. Whether Japan has within her cultural resources the wherewithal for successfully 'doing' vanguard science and technology becomes a critical question.

A major commitment on the part of Japanese industrial and government leaders to 'exploratory R & D' will represent a significant departure from past policies and practices. Hitherto Japan has been largely a 'follower country' in this regard borrowing advanced technology to fuel its manufacturing processes. Japanese industry has consistently allocated large amounts of money to 'applied R & D' especially in the electronics field. For the most part these expenditures have been made by the private sector (70%) with government playing a subsidiary role. This long standing practice has provided Japanese firms with a competitive edge across a broad spectrum of finished consumer products. The 'revolutionary' aspect of the commitment to exploratory R & D is twofold: (1) Japan is embarking upon an intellectual/technical activity heretofore regarded by many as

Advancing to the Frontiers of the Post-Industrial Era. Attention has been consistently directed to Japan's growth rates in production and productivity (even today both near the top). What has only recently been recognized is an 'adaptiveness' on the part of the Japanese economy which, today, may be its most important characteristic with significant consequences for the future. This seemingly new ability to adjust to the stringencies of markets (import and export) clearly exhibited itself as Japan grappled with the energy crises of the seventies. No small part of her success in reducing dependency upon oil was an ability to shift from those industries which were high consumers of (oil-fired) energy to those requiring considerably less. Japan's transition from a secondary to a tertiary economy (to the so-called 'post-industrial era'), a process now into its second decade, has been occasioned by more than an energy crisis. What this transition has done is indicate to the world that Japan has grasped the complexities of a rapidly evolving national and global economy and has committed itself to a process of economic evolution and adaptation. Japan is no longer producing the wide range of labor intensive manufactured goods it once did (textiles the major example, of course) and today is importing those goods. But the Japanese domestic market has changed in other ways as well; it is a major market for high-tech consumer goods. The Japanese turn in this direction has been occasioned by new demands both at home and abroad and sets the stage for a hypothesis which may be helpful in explaining the transition that is taking place in the Japanese economy.

The hypothesis is as much about Japan's perception of herself as a

postwar Japan has displayed those traits most satisfactory to the people as a whole it is prudent to assess those elements, cultural and otherwise, which have the potential for disrupting what many observers continue to regard as a 'fragile' balance.

Japan's sense of vulnerability is not easily grasped in the West where governments and publics alike are preoccupied with Japanese achievements. The ingredients of the vulnerability syndrome are plain enough if the resultant impact is not: Japan's insular geography, its dense population centers, the paucity of natural resources, the dependence on export markets, its psychological isolation. It is, perhaps, not too much to say that since 'the opening' of the country in the mid-19th century Japan has found itself in a world of colossi - China - Russia - Great Britain - America. An obsession with Korea was only one (immediate, to be sure) among many Lilliputian reactions. The great barrier - the sea - protective, sheltering throughout Japan's history had become instead a great avenue. Without effective physical barriers others would have to be established. In this line of analysis the argument is that Japan, now irrevocably caught up in interdependent world affairs, remains instinctively isolationist and nationalistic. Thus, at the very center of the 'question of Japan' is a fundamental dilemma, perhaps never to be resolved. At the center of 'the question of Japan' there is a continuing tension: whether to turn inward or outward.

It is common of late to speak of a "laager mentality" (however mistakenly) on the part of South Africans. It may not be as mistaken to

do so in the case of the Japanese if what we mean by this is cultural defense of the volk (jin). Subtle but nonetheless effective barriers have been found to replace physical barriers - none quite so effective possibly as language. Socio-linguistic analysts (e.g., R. A. Miller) do not conclude that the Japanese language is unique in the sense that it is wholly indigenous (it is not), however, terms not of foreign origin have a special place - a 'uniqueness'. Japanese linguists use words to describe their language in terms of mystical religious experience. This is to suggest that the language has a special significance for its native users that cannot be conveyed to outsiders. The non-foreign words, peculiar to the Japanese people, reinforce common identity and cultural separateness. The variety of meanings, nuances, suggestions possible with the same words and phrases is unique. In very real terms the language serves as a barrier more effectively than it serves as a mode of communication. Japanese uneasiness with foreigners who have (or appear to have) a profound grasp of the language is well known. Equally evident is the relaxed attitude of Japanese with foreigners who struggle with their language. This can well be construed as defense of the territory; it can be construed as defense of the culture. Foreigners insensitive to the substantial social-cultural-religious content of the language, insensitive to the significance Japanese attach to their language, unaware of the role it plays in interactions with foreigners will only exacerbate relationships.

The role religion and morals play as determinants of political behavior (as cultural elements of the polity) must be considered. In Japan today paradoxes abound. On the one hand there is substantial

basis for the view that Japanese today are skeptical of religion and religious beliefs, in short, that Japanese society is highly secularized. Clearly, there remains a strong identification of Shintoism with the excesses of the war-time period. Yet national census data and polling indicate that an overwhelming majority of Japanese are both 'Shintoists' and 'Buddhists'. Skepticism towards religion generally is strongest among the urban young, yet at the same time they are given to behavior which implies superstition, regard for omens, and a strong disposition to choose daian days for marriage ('great peace', 'good luck' days). More importantly, perhaps, there appears to be a reluctance among the new generation to take up questions of morals (there is very little in the way of formal, explicit moral education in the Japanese school system) in part because such discussions have an aura of 'traditionalism'. Yet it is not possible to point to a declining standard of public morals in Japan. On the contrary, polling data again indicate a general public perception of a rising standard from the 1970's to the 1980's. It may be significant to note in this connection that the word mana ('manners') is common among the young rather than the word dotoku ('morals'). This avoids the taint of traditionalism but permits a dutiful adherence to cultural norms. Religion and morals in Japan today warrant close attention if only because they are in flux.

The question that inevitably arises in any assessment of contemporary Japan, especially where the focus is on the new generation, is that of nationalism. It is commonplace to note the 'disappearance of

nationalism' in the immediate post-war years (with some observers even suggesting that an irreversible aversion for the sentiments and trappings of nationalism has taken possession of the Japanese people). Increasingly of late there are contrary suggestions that 'national pride' and 'self confidence' are key elements of Japan's restoration as a significant actor on the world stage. The implication is that these elements have been destructive in the past and could well become so again. This is yet another of those occasions when it will be useful to draw a distinction.

The experience of World War II (and the political turbulence within Japan preceding the war) have not produced a "denationalization" of the Japanese people. Opinion polling throughout the postwar period indicates a new nationalism rooted in cultural-social values and notably lacking in political content. The cultural bonds of nationhood remain strong; when stress is put on the 'unique' cultural values of Japan respondents display filial attachment to the nation. However, attachment to the state apparatus is not strong. State symbols such as the national flag and the national anthem (Kimigayo) are not conspicuous parts of Japanese life. There is little in the way of consensus that government meets public needs (functions effectively in the delivery of public goods, if one likes). When asked in a recent survey, "do you want to contribute to the state?", less than fifteen per cent (15%) of those responding said 'yes.' Only cautious conclusions are in order: an explicit political ideology is not part of the political consciousness of the great majority of the Japanese people. Moreover, it is probably fair to say that this is not a 'politicized' public (predominantly

single-issue groups in labor and agriculture aside) at all. On the other hand there is a sense of 'nationhood', of cultural heritage, which the Japanese are concerned to sustain. If there are 'destructive' implications in this concern they are not apparent at this juncture.

Much of Japan's legacy of cultural values remains vital in the family setting, the work-place where most Japanese spend the greater part of their lives, and as we have seen at the national level as well. This patrimony constitutes an important brake (control mechanism) on the pace of change and precludes 'radical' departures. At any event there have not been any 'radical' or 'disruptive' upheavals in the post-war period. A close observer of Japanese society concludes that there are not significant norm differences between generations because "... the structural constraints on the exercise of individual initiative and optative behavior remain firmly grounded in the objective conditions of the real world, the society the Japanese have built (emphasis mine)". (Robert J. Smith. Japanese Society. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 123.) Smith, himself, goes on to say that "... the individual is urged to strive for perfection. If individuals attain that goal, then society, being the creation of individuals, is perfectible." The fact that the social goal of harmony may be beyond reach should not result in our discounting it as a goal. Important constraints operate in present-day Japan against the emergence of 'an excessive nationalism'. If the latter should nonetheless emerge the argument of this study is that it will not be as a result of a weakening of cultural norms but as the result of externally induced trauma. Japan

may well be more susceptible to the vicissitudes of the international environment than others. We shall turn to that shortly, but before doing so, it is necessary to examine in some detail the role of the major instrumentality in the post-war Japanese polity - the Liberal Democratic Party.

The Polity and the Role of the LDP. A long-time observer and close student of Japanese history (Marius Jansen) noted a few years ago that "... writers have been telling us that an era was about to come to an end in Japan...(and that) Japanese nationalism was about to reassert itself." (Marius Jansen. Japan and Its World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980; p. 111.) For his own part, however, he added that "it seems to me that the options for genuine innovation and realignment for Japan are very limited." Perhaps nothing reinforces the view of Jansen quite so much as the long-term domination of the Japanese political process by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The explanation for this domination is found, by and large, in Japan's successful post-war economic resurgence with which the LDP has (successfully) identified itself. There are a number of implications which should be made explicit (without carrying any of them very far). Japan's post-war preoccupation and her striking post-war achievement has been in and with the economic realm. The political achievement of 'the Conservatives who rule Japan' (N. Thayer) consists of the careful management of the consensus which has emerged out of the economic achievement. The pragmatic implication in this line of argument is that 'consensus' in Japan does not have a political core - much less an ideological core. So long as the LDP can identify with and preside over

an economically stable Japan it will continue to enjoy 'political' success. While this will require the continuing 'internationalization' of Japan's economy it may preclude 'internationalization' in the political and military spheres on grounds that the latter are 'diversionary' and 'adventuristic'.

It is commonplace to note that the LDP is 'conservative'; it is not frequently noted that the LDP is flexible and pragmatic especially when viewed against 'dogmatic' opposition parties. The flexibility and progressivity of the LDP is displayed not in its initiation of social measures but in its ability to anticipate and respond to emerging socio-economic concerns of the public. Welfare programs, fiscal measures, environmental programs (the development of public infrastructures) represent creative responses on the part of the LDP to public pressures (although as we state elsewhere the public does not evidence a high degree of satisfaction with the delivery of public goods). The rigidity of opposition parties, on the other hand, is equally a political fact of life in Japan contributing to the continuity and dominance of the LDP. It is unlikely, to say the least, that the Japan Socialist Part (JSP) - the largest of the opposition parties - could take a leadership role, short of drastically altering basic doctrine and politics (i.e., its political identity). Some ninety per cent (90%) of Japanese workers identify themselves as 'middle-class' suggesting little proletarian consciousness. In this connection the JSP's 'abandonment of Marxism' is not likely to alter voter perceptions. The present and foreseeable role of 'The Opposition' in Japanese politics is not that of posing a

plausible alternative, but as one opposition phrase has it "applying the brakes to LDP excesses."

The rapid economic growth of the past four decades with its impacts on basic socio-cultural values has produced changing attitudes and changing modes of involvement in the political process. There is an active involvement in "routine" political activities such as voting and participation in labor union activities. In the past two decades consumer movements and other citizen movements (jyumin-undo or shimin-undo) have arisen. However, it must be noted that these are, by and large, ad hoc, issue-specific movements without any substantial national base. For example, the victims of the Minamata disease (an outgrowth of a chemical company's discharge of mercury into Minamata Bay in Kumamoto prefecture) organized a movement to obtain compensation from the company. This set off other similar anti-pollution movements and while these came to have a loose association with the labor movement there was little if any impact on national politics. Such movements appear to be aimed at the resolution of specific issues and not at the political system as such. They do not stem from an ideological base although they might well be catalogued as 'reformist'. To be sure, Agriculture Cooperatives (e.g., Nokyo, the Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives) are linked with and exert strong pressure on the LDP. On the horizon is the possibility of women as an active 'movement' in Japanese politics although, again, this movement is likely to be issue specific as well. In short, the Japanese public is not a strong, intrusive factor in the management of national consensus which is the task of political elites. However, as we shall see, when elite

consensus breaks down the public will play a larger political role.

The dynamics of consensus management in Japan are in essence the dynamics of consensus management within the LDP, the political party which has dominated the Japanese political scene since 1955 (if not 1948). Notwithstanding the fact that today the LDP must rely on 'an arrangement' with the New Liberal Club to function as 'the majority' in the Lower House of the Diet no opposition party has been able to close the electoral gap which (measured against other democratic political systems in the West) remains 'wide'. The durability of the LDP coalition - the party is a coalition of 'factions' - derives from the overarching commitment to cohesion and continuity. (The main point of consensus is that 'consensus' must be maintained!) Stalwart adherence to 'four factional rules' has been cited as the magnetic force which draws potentially unstable elements to the center. Successful LDP consensus management requires that (1) no one faction becomes so big that it can control the party alone; (2) policy differences among factions (or faction leaders) do not become so strong as to seriously inhibit the forging of factional coalitions; (3) personal antagonisms among faction leaders, similarly, do not inhibit coalition formation; and (4) lines of cleavage among factions do not 'institutionalize' themselves forcing the party apart. (J. A. A. Stockwin. "Japanese Politics: New Directions or the Story as Before?", in Asian Affairs, 14 (October 1983), pp. 260-270.) Today there are signs of faltering adherence to the rules.

Stockwin does not articulate an 'unstated rule' to the effect that

the LDP will seek to pre-determine election outcomes through coalition building (i.e., through negotiations among faction leaders). In the absence of this particular example of 'elite consensus' the Party must go to 'primaries' thereby putting the question of party and government leadership at least to some degree in the hands of prefectural party members. Some observers see this litmus test of LDP solidarity breaking down in the Miki and Ohira elections - holding in the case of Suzuki - and breaking down again in the 1982 election of Nakasone. Resort to primaries did serve to meet growing criticism that rank and file LDP members had little voice in leadership selection. It also served to give Nakasone a base of support in the country broader than his factional base within the party and a 'surprise' election as Party President and Prime Minister. Mr. Nakasone was able to exploit his superior speaking skills and charismatic 'presence' with the public as polls taken through the course of the campaign demonstrated. What may mark the 1982 election as a 'watershed' is an unintended effect: if the leading candidate in these prefectural elections wins with a substantial majority, as Nakasone did (58%), it all but rules out the 'election' of the number two candidate to either post and provides the new Prime Minister with a 'mandate'. An even more far-reaching consequence may be emerging, however. Turning to the prefectures for the settling of leadership disputes may be part of a broader 'internalization' trend on the part of the LDP.

Demographic trends alone require the LDP to focus on 'constituency reform'. Faction leaders have always been confronted with the problem

of maintaining their 'base' in the constituencies even to the point of contesting with each other for seats in 'safe' LDP districts. Today this perennial problem is aggravated by demographics and by a much intensified factional struggle. The recent proposal by the LDP to reduce some half dozen 'rural constituencies' (3 - 5 lower house seats each) to two seats each, and 'transfer' the surplusage to urban constituencies has both demographic and factional overtones (quite apart from how it might work to the disadvantage of opposition parties). There is little doubt that the voter migration (from rural to urban districts) problem must be addressed - that more Diet members must be drawn from urban districts. The larger point, however, is the rapid ascendancy in the LDP of 'local candidates'. In the wake of the 'double blow' to the principal faction leader, Tanaka Kakuei, (first, his criminal indictment, and secondly, his declining health) there are redoubled efforts by all factional leaders to build their following to the requisite level for commanding cabinet positions - the problem of kiban (Seiji-teki Kiban). In this process there is evidence that recruitment from local levels is being stepped up if not emphasized. It is not as important as it once was to come from elite categories (national political level, bureaucracy, business) to aspire to a national political career. What is not yet evident is whether increased local recruiting indicates a new priority for grass roots issues and a commensurate downplaying of the LDP's traditional international agenda. There are some indications of this.

The intensified factional struggle within the LDP today is occasioned by the perceived erosion of the Tanaka faction and

displeasure on the part of other factional leaders with the Prime Minister both for his own adroit factional maneuvering (which garnered him a 59% popularity rate in 1984) and, more significantly, for his active foreign policy with its strong internationalization thrust. Opposing faction leaders are engaged in something of a 'roll-back' campaign and, indeed, Mr. Nakasone - adroitly - has sought to take the spotlight off the international agenda and turn it to domestic issues. Polling data throughout the eighties consistently shows the public more concerned with a range of domestic issues than with foreign policy issues. What we are seeing at this juncture may be only a short-term phenomenon. On the other hand, the LDP may find considerable political profit in playing upon the strong propensity for domestic issues among locality-based politicians. An 'internalization' thrust may be in progress as the LDP makes a conscious effort to reinforce its cultural alignment (a phrase we prefer in this context to 'strengthening its political base') with the public. If we can assume an easing of factional struggle in the near-term years and consolidation around a new 'principal faction' this will permit Japan to proceed with economic internationalization. A legacy of the current struggle for which we must be prepared, however, is a 'go slow' signal to the new principals as they consider other and more questionable elements of 'internationalization'.

The Polity as a Function of the Partnership with the US. Political stability in Japan depends, perhaps to a larger degree than most Americans appreciate, on a continuing, stable relationship with the

United States. There are other explanatory factors, as we have attempted to make clear in this paper, but the critical external variable is 'the special relationship'. The necessity to understand the extent and limits of this relationship on the part of both sides cannot be overstated. A decade ago a Japanese scholar wrote that "there is in Japan no sense of her mission or her role in the world." (M. Kosaka, "Options for Japan's Foreign Policy," in Adelphi Papers, 97 London: IISS, 1973.) While deploring the lack of a sense of mission this same scholar offered the intriguing observation that "... standing in international politics is not something to be provided, and it is only by extending her activities beyond purely economic ones that Japan will achieve such a position." Japan is prepared at this later juncture to expand its non-economic activities at the international level. But it is prepared to do so primarily in the form of expanded linkages with the United States, precisely because of Tokyo's judgement that the stability of the Japanese political system so requires. A basic psychological penchant for a close bilateral relationship (eschewing nebulous, multilateral arrangements) is a starting point for Japan in working towards a 'mature partnership' with the United States. Japan's economic success, notwithstanding, a strong sense of her vulnerability is at the root of a psychology of insecurity. In any consideration of the 'options' open to Japan one must be sensitive to this psychology. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that, should 'the special relationship' dissolve, Japan through some kind of metamorphosis might embark on a wholly 'autonomous' course, or with equally unpredictable results simply allow her 'destiny to drift'.

These are not likely prospects, however, if the American 'partner' (for its part) does not impose on the relationship requirements which would exceed Japanese psychic capacity. The suggestion no matter how obliquely put that Japan is or should become 'a world class power' could well be just such an excessive demand. Starting from the undisputed fact of Japan's 'economic internationalization' and its role as 'a world class trading nation' there is a tendency in American 'declarations' (official ones at that)³ to make the transition - within a matter of paragraphs - to Japan as "a world class power'. Our purpose in this paper is not to examine where American interests lie in the relationship with Japan over the near-term. There is precious little current or immediately prospective data to support the notion of Japan as 'a world class power', that is to say, for attempting to draw out of Japan's world class trading status an altogether different status. What is germane in all of this for the present study is the following: at a time when there is a significant 'debate' taking place within the ranks of the LDP along 'internationalization/internalization' lines American sensitivity (in particular) to the fundamental character and long term implications of that debate is imperative. The debate does not go to the question of Japan's 'economic internationalization', but it does touch on the question of how broad a role Japan should play in the world - how far beyond a 'special relationship' with the United States Japan should go.

It is more than evident that there are paradoxical and often times wholly contradictory elements in the Japanese posture towards the world

at large. Some of the complexity - and potential volatility - of the Japanese in this regard is nowhere better indicated than in a document which the present Prime Minister authored in 1970. It is illuminating reading for what it suggests about the prospects for continuity and change in Japan today. In the Preface to his "Defense White Paper" Mr. Nakasone acknowledges that "the cause which led Japan into the World War in the past and which inflicted unprecedented disaster on the people was no other than the supremacy of military affairs over politics." While fully appreciative of this fact he then offers the interesting comment that "as a reaction to excessive nationalism of the pre-war days, the post-war trend inclined to the denial of the most natural and human emotion of loving his own country. We think that, after twenty-five years since the end of the war, we have come to a time when we must self-reflect." Nakasone's attempt to initiate self-reflection in Japan was greeted by some as an example of moral/political courage but, perhaps, by most at the time (1970/1971) as an example of typical flamboyance if not recklessness. (An earlier contention of this study is that there is no lack of love of nation in Japan. The post-war tendency of which Mr. Nakasone spoke was not particularly strong it would appear.)

Mr. Nakasone went somewhat farther in 'his Paper'. He put strong emphasis upon the spiritual-cultural heritage of Japan arguing that the people 'must have awareness' of this heritage and 'show willingness' to defend it. This could by no means be construed as 'a call to arms', although it clearly suggested that the Japanese Constitution did not preclude Japan from maintaining "Self Defense Forces." It might,

however, be construed as an appeal to nationalism or, at a minimum, a warning against the opposite danger of 'isolationism'. After much in the way of emotive language there is this: "the most important thing ... is the will for defense ... in other words, this is patriotism ... without such a spiritual foundation of the people, a nation's defense cannot be accomplished."

In retrospect, after fifteen years, it is somewhat easier to conclude that what Mr. Nakasone wanted to accomplish through his suggestive Paper was 'the Defense of Japan' - and something even more fundamental. Three possibilities were open (1) neutrality, (2) non-alignment, and (3) collective security. The first two options were impracticable; the third reduced to making the US-Japan Security Treaty a working partnership over time. The trauma and chaos that overtook Japan in the thirties and forties could not be avoided in the future through isolation, neutrality, non-alignment (or for that matter reliance upon multilateral schemes). The best practical path to follow (the thinking is Aristotelian if nothing else) was to build a mature partnership with the United States. This offered not only the optimal solution to 'the defense of Japan' it provided a powerful guarantor to the stability of the Japanese polity. Relatively secure in terms of its informing cultural values the Japanese polity (as well as the Japanese economy) is peculiarly susceptible to storms in the environment. The great antidote to environmental turbulence is full partnership with the US. To carry matters farther than that might well incur risks to Japanese political stability not worth taking.

END NOTES

1. In the past decade the Japanese press, popular magazines, and research institutes have been examining the changing profile of the family. In 1955 close to 65% of women in the labor force were unmarried. By 1978 the majority of women (55%) in the labor force were married. Likewise, the majority of women in the labor force had one or more children. In showing a steady decline of contact between mother and children in present-day Japan one study went so far as to establish that the average hours of conversation per day between a mother and children (1st through 8th grades) had dropped to 0.66. The Data File series of the Tokyo University Research Institute (PHP) is a major source of such sociometric data. See also the PHP annual series under the heading of Suji De Miru Nippon No Ayumi (Japan's Footprint Seen Through Statistics). The study cited below in the text by Suzuki is also germane in this connection.
2. Scholarly jargon particularly in the realm of methodological problems may well strike the layman as 'enigmatic'. The characterization all too often is warranted. Nonetheless the problem of how one approaches a subject as subtle as that of 'the prospects for continuity and change in Japan' is not a small one. The choice of approaches will have a critical bearing on the results produced by the study. In this connection the reader is referred to a valuable (if, perhaps, at times 'enigmatic') discussion of the problem by Professor Roger Benjamin of the University of Minnesota: "Minerva and the Crane (Tsuru): Birds of a Feather? Comparative Research and Japanese Political Change - A Review Article," in Journal of Asian Studies, XI (November, 1980), pp. 69-76. Benjamin poses the question "[w]hich vision of Japanese politics - stability or conflict and change - has the greater merit?" To a considerable degree the question of 'merit' will be resolved by the theoretical approach taken he suggests. What he recommends at all events is that we eschew models which have utility in looking at the American case ('the ethnocentric fallacy' which Americans are all too inclined to fall into) and use a model which will get at the Japanese qualities of the Japanese case.
3. "U.S. - Japan Relations: Dangers and Opportunities, Myths and Realities", An Address by Paul D. Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary of State (East Asian and Pacific Affairs), to the Associated Japan-American Societies of the United States. June 13, 1985.

END

FILMED

10-85

DTIC